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Abstract 
While claims abound regarding transitional justice’s importance for democracy building 
in transitioning countries, empirical investigations of these remain limited or have 
produced contradictory findings. This article seeks to contribute to these debates by 
investigating the relationship between transitional justice and democratic institution-
building in Uganda – looking in particular at the rule of law, the security forces and 
participation. It does so by exploring the causal mechanisms linking transitional justice to 
democracy, that is, the means through which transitional justice exerts its impact. 
Transitional justice is widely expected to impact democratic institution-building through 
three mechanisms: (de)legitimation, reform, and empowerment. However, this article 
finds that in Uganda, transitional justice’s impact through these is more circumscribed 
than has so far been assumed, and that it sometimes impacts democratic institution-
building negatively. The Ugandan experience furthermore suggests that in contexts of 
armed conflict and a hybrid regime, expectations about the extent to which transitional 
justice can support democratic institution-building should be lowered. 
Keywords: Uganda, transitional justice impact, democracy, ICC, truth commission, 
amnesties 
 
The growing recourse to transitional justice measures to address legacies of mass 
human rights abuses has provoked an intense debate about their effectiveness. Now that 
transitional justice has moved out of its infancy - a period marked by high hopes and 
bold, some would say idealistic, claims about its ability to help transitional countries 
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build stable and peaceful polities – scholars and practitioners are increasingly contesting 
its political and societal effects. Whereas for some transitional justice has the ability to 
radically overhaul political processes and societies, others question whether these 
claims are realistic and effective. A major challenge is that views on transitional 
justice’s effects are often normatively rather than empirically founded. As Thoms, Ron, 
and Paris observed, “it is striking that so many commentators have expressed such 
strong positions on the basis of so little reliable evidence”.1 
Claims about transitional justice’s impact on democracy are particularly 
contentious. At its inception, transitional justice was conceived as a measure to 
accompany and support transitions towards democracy, by contributing to building a 
new polity based on the rule of law and human rights. Although transitional justice is no 
longer confined to transitions out of authoritarian rule and many transitions did not in 
fact see the emergence of democracy, the assumption that transitional justice is meant to 
ensure that countries undergoing a transition move towards democracy, rather than 
another form of governance, remains widespread. Yet, in practice, we know very little 
about whether transitional justice contributes to democracy - and if it does, how so.  
The present article aims to contribute to these debates by exploring the 
relationship between transitional justice and democratic institution-building in Uganda, 
focusing in particular on the causal processes linking both. Uganda offers an interesting 
case study because it has a mixed record in terms of democratic development since its 
attempted transition in 1986.2 Uganda not only evolved into a hybrid regime but it also 
continued to experience armed conflict in parts of the country, thus creating an 
environment that could be labelled as an incomplete or aborted transition (some would 
even say a ‘non transition’). The fact that the democratic transition largely failed in 
Uganda does not make it any less interesting to explore how transitional justice 
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interacted with (non-) democratic transformations in the country. Uganda offers an 
opportunity to investigate an intriguing instance of democratic failure with transitional 
justice. Moreover, transitional justice measures were implemented at various periods in 
time: some closely following the regime transition, while others well after regime 
consolidation and while armed conflict was ongoing, or while peace negotiations were 
underway – thus combining elements of ‘transitional justice’, ‘in transition justice’ and 
‘post-transition justice’. Uganda thus represents a case of non-linear transition, which 
can be expected to produce particular challenges for transitional justice impact. 
I will begin by critically reviewing the existing literature on the relationship 
between democracy and transitional justice, following which I present three commonly 
assumed (though undertheorised) pathways of transitional justice impact. After an 
overview of Uganda’s democratic trajectory, the empirical section investigates to what 
extent the claimed pathways of impact are observed in the Ugandan case, and to what 
effect. To this end, it looks at three state-led transitional justice measures: trials, 
commissions of inquiry, and amnesties. The paper finds that transitional justice’s impact 
is more circumscribed than has so far been assumed by the literature, and that it 
sometimes impacts democratic institution-building negatively. The case study further 
suggests that in a context where the political will for democratisation is limited and a 
hybrid regime is firmly entrenched, expectations about the extent to which transitional 
justice can support democratic institution-building should be lowered. 
Transitional Justice and Democracy 
Both transitional justice and democracy are complex and multifaceted processes, 
making it difficult to unravel and conceptualise their relationship. Not only is 
democracy an amorphous concept subject to a variety of interpretations, but there is also 
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no definite agreement on which factors cause democracy or help explain why certain 
countries achieve democratic ‘success’ while others do not. In this context, determining 
if transitional justice is a factor supporting democratic development constitutes a 
formidable task. Within the existing literature, there are broadly three views about the 
nature of their relationship: transitional justice as a necessary condition for democracy, 
as harmful to democracy, and as dependent on democratic progress.  
According to some, transitional justice is necessary for democracy because it 
strengthens the rule of law, deters human rights abuses, promotes reconciliation and 
prevents vigilante justice.3 By reshaping institutions, actors, identities and social 
behaviour – that is, by redefining the social and political order - transitional justice has 
the potential to positively contribute to democracy. It is purported to do so in a variety 
of ways, ranging from restoring relations between previously antagonistic groups; 
encouraging open debates about the past and thereby constructing a new inclusive 
political and social memory; to restoring citizen’s trust in public institutions; and 
providing an opportunity for new leaders to signal a break with past non-democratic 
practices.  
More critical scholars however caution that transitional justice often fails to 
deliver on its promises of improved human rights protection and reconciliation, and 
sometimes even risks destabilising democratisation processes, increasing human rights 
abuses, heightening political and societal tensions, and hampering negotiations for 
political transitions.4 Trials and truth commissions may fail to contribute to democracy 
through truth telling as they sometimes produce distorted or partial historical 
understandings of the past, due to either procedural constraints or political 
instrumentalisation by elites.5 In turn, truth commissions and memorials can revive or 
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aggravate societal tensions, while their lack of punishment of perpetrators may provoke 
resentment, vigilante justice, and weaken trust in public institutions.  
A third approach flips around the relationship between transitional justice and 
democracy, by arguing that transitional justice’s effectiveness depends on the presence 
of a minimum level of democracy in a country. For instance, the existence of a vibrant 
civil society – a key marker of democratic quality – has been found to play an important 
role in promoting transitional justice.6 It is also argued that trials and truth commissions 
are more likely to take place and be effective if a functioning judiciary and democratic 
culture are in place.7 Transitional justice is thus seen as reflecting rather than causing 
democratic developments. A central prescription drawn from this is the importance of 
the timing of transitional justice processes and the need, where necessary, to postpone 
transitional justice until a country has achieved some degree of democratic progress.  
A common feature of these contrasting studies is their limited explicit 
exploration of pathways of impact, that is, the causal mechanisms linking transitional 
justice to democracy. Quantitative studies have highlighted where correlations exist (or 
not) but they tell us little about the means through which transitional justice exerts its 
effects (whether direct or indirect, and intentional or unintentional). This is illustrated 
by Olsen, Payne, and Reiter’s study which finds that truth commissions are associated 
with lower levels of subsequent human rights protections.8 While this is an important 
finding, their study tells us little about why truth commissions produce such outcomes. 
Qualitative studies, in turn, largely take for granted normative aspirations about 
transitional justice effects and adopt these as measurements for success. For instance, 
evaluations of truth commission success are often based on whether they satisfactorily 
fulfil their truth telling mandate, based on the assumption that truth-telling supports 
democracy building. Yet truth telling can impact democracy positively or negatively: it 
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may help strengthen democratic values and diffuse conflicts about the past, but it can 
equally entrench political polarisation and senses of victimisation. Expanding our 
understanding of transitional justice impact thus requires a critical engagement with the 
field’s normative assumptions about how transitional justice impacts democracy. 
Means of Transitional Justice Impact 
This article focuses on exploring transitional justice’s state level or institutional impact, 
referred to here as ‘democratic institution-building’. The aim is to investigate to what 
extent transitional justice contributes not only to the development of democratic 
institutions and principles, but also to the performance of these institutions. In order to 
avoid using unrealistic measurements for transitional justice’s impact, it is important to 
focus on those components of democratic institution-building on which transitional 
justice can reasonably be expected to have an impact. Therefore, three dimensions were 
looked at in particular: the rule of law (defined minimally as the presence of an 
independent and effective judiciary), the security forces (whose democratic character 
resides in their subordination to civilian control, their non-interference in politics, and 
their respect for human rights), and participation (defined as citizen’s equal access to 
the political process, independently of ethnicity, religion, gender, regional or political 
belonging).  This choice is empirically grounded – that is, it is at these levels that 
transitional justice can reasonably be expected to have an impact democracy – but also 
theoretically based – that is, they are widely recognised in the democracy literature as 
constitutive elements of democracy.9  
The focus of the article is on exploring how transitional justice impacts 
democratic institution-building. So far, studies have insufficiently engaged with theories 
of change or the causal mechanisms underpinning our assumptions about transitional 
justice impact.10 Causal mechanisms allow us to peer inside the relationship between 
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variables by defining the pathways or processes through which an effect is produced.11 
In addition to allowing us to look ‘inside the black box’, they also enable us to integrate 
in the analysis the possibility that variable X has different means through which it 
impacts variable Y. Also, while causal mechanisms are meant to have a general scope 
and be portable across different social and political contexts, they are also context 
sensitive.12 They therefore make it possible to consider how contextual factors can 
influence the outcome X has on Y, a consideration which is particularly important when 
trying to modulate policy interventions. Overall, causal mechanisms thus allow us to 
represent the complexities of the social word and the multi-dimensional nature of 
interactions between variables. 
So far, systematic theorisation on the processes linking transitional justice and 
democratic institution-building is scarce. Nevertheless, common assumptions exist 
within the literature about how transitional justice exerts impact. Drawing from these, I 
suggest three possible mechanisms through which transitional justice impacts 
democracy: (de)legitimation, reform and empowerment. The empirical section will 
explore to what extent these mechanisms are observed in the Ugandan case, and 
whether they produce the outcome postulated in the literature. It is important to stress 
that the causal mechanisms proposed here are not exhaustive but merely exploratory 
and focused only on explaining transitional justice’s state-level or institutional impact. 
Additional mechanisms such as cognitive reframing and identity reshaping may, for 
instance, be important in explaining transitional justice’s effect on societal or 
individual-level dimensions such as democratic culture or reconciliation. 
(De)legitimation 
A core attribute of transitional justice is that it seeks to shed light on the past by 
assigning responsibilities for human rights abuses. It therefore has the potential to 
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strongly impact views about who does and does not constitute a legitimate political 
actor in the post-transition era. Through this, transitional justice can impact the 
distribution of domestic power relations and social capital on which different actors can 
draw to pursue certain policies or goals, which historical sociologists propose are 
important factors conditioning democratic outcome.  
The causal assumption is that if transitional justice is implemented it may help 
weaken the influence and power of anti-democratic forces,13 which in turn allows for 
the dismantling of “authoritarian legacies” which would otherwise hamper democratic 
developments in the rule of law, security forces, and participation. There are various 
means through which transitional justice is expected to weaken anti-democratic forces. 
First, it can produce the direct removal of individuals, for instance, when they are 
sentenced by a court or removed from positions in state institutions following a vetting 
process. Past abusers are effectively barred from exerting political power, making it 
more difficult for them to weigh on the political process and block democratic change. 
Second, in the absence of a direct removal of individuals, transitional justice can also 
result in ‘naming and shaming’. In such instances, the political influence of anti-
democratic forces will be eroded through a loss of public support, disavowal by 
moderate political actors (including in parties linked to the old regime) and/or key 
international interveners.14 Thirdly, through transitional justice, narratives about the past 
can be produced, reproduced, and contested (or, in the negative, controlled) which can 
serve to challenge legitimising discourses used by actors or institutions linked to past 
abuses.  
In turn, it is claimed that transitional justice can serve to strengthen nascent 
democratic forces.15 It offers a symbolic means through which the new regime distances 
itself from formerly abusive actors and affirms its attachment to human rights and 
8 
 
democratic principles. It can provide the new regime with much-needed international 
and domestic legitimacy, giving it the necessary political and social capital to dismantle 
authoritarian enclaves. By highlighting past exclusions and discriminations, and forcing 
the state to acknowledge these, transitional justice can furthermore re-legitimise and 
promote the integration of previously excluded groups, thereby broadening the scope 
for participation. 
Reform 
Another way in which transitional justice is expected to impact democracy is by 
promoting legislative, constitutional, or institutional reforms, which aim to improve the 
democratic and human performance of institutions.16 Transitional justice may trigger 
reforms such as the dismantlement of previously abusive state institutions, the 
redefinition of institutional prerogatives and powers, the creation of oversight and 
human rights monitoring bodies, the adoption of policy measures aimed at addressing 
structural inequalities, legislative or constitutional revisions strengthening human rights 
protections, or the introduction of measures to enforce judicial independence and the 
subordination of the security forces. In this way, transitional justice is thus expected to 
contribute to the redirection, recalibration and renegotiation of institutions in a way that 
supports democracy.  
The means through which transitional justice may promote reforms is by contributing to 
the identification of the causes of human rights abuses and the institutional failures 
which made such abuses possible. This can lead to the formulation of concrete reform 
recommendations, stimulate public pressures for such reforms, and induce the state to 
acknowledge and address these institutional failures. Alternatively, transitional justice 
can promote reforms more indirectly by supporting capacity building of state 
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institutions through the provision of human rights or professional training, the 
distribution of material or financial resources, or providing opportunities for personnel 
secondment and exchanges. Finally, transitional justice, it is argued, can stimulate 
reforms by putting forward or demonstrating the validity of new norms, values, and 
practices - such as respect for international human rights norms, standards of criminal 
procedure, due process, impartiality, and inclusiveness.17 
Empowerment 
A more diffuse claim about how transitional justice is linked to democratic 
institution building is that it can contribute to ending exclusions and marginalisations 
which would otherwise weaken democratic practices and developments. It can empower 
individuals to demand state action and serve as a tool for social integration.18 In 
particular, transitional justice is expected to contribute to the empowerment of 
disadvantaged groups. Depending on the context, these may include ethnic, regional, 
linguistic or political groups, women, youths, or religious minorities. Transitional 
justice is thus expected to reshape power relations not only within the state but also 
between the state and its citizens as it creates a space for previously disempowered 
actors and citizens more broadly to increase their influence over government. 
The means through which transitional justice can do this is by creating spaces 
where citizen mobilisation can occur, about not only justice demands but also broader 
human rights, exclusion, and democracy concerns. Transitional justice thus offers a 
platform and a voice to previously marginalised individuals or communities. Another 
means through which transitional justice is expected to act is by contributing to the 
identification and acknowledgment of past exclusions. Transitional justice, it is argued, 
is well placed to highlight problems of discrimination and disenfranchisement, and 
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thereby encourage state responsiveness to these problems.19 Transitional justice 
mechanisms such as courts or truth commissions can directly contest state 
discriminatory practices or promote marginalised individuals or groups’ greater access 
to resources and services. In this sense, courts and truth commissions can function as 
tools of legal empowerment. In some instances, transitional justice mechanisms can 
even directly provide redress to disenfranchised individuals.20 
Uganda’s Incomplete Transition to Democracy 
Uganda presents a mixed record in terms of democratic development. While from 
independence in 1962 to the 1986 capture of power by the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) of current President Yoweri Museveni the country was marked by 
political instability, mass human rights abuses and authoritarianism, the country has 
since evolved into a hybrid regime. Such regimes are characterised by the rhetorical 
adoption of liberal democratic discourses and the implementation of some liberal 
institutions – such as the organisation of elections – while at the same time keeping in 
place authoritarian practices and informalised and personalised systems of governance. 
The country now enjoys a certain degree of stability and multipartism was introduced in 
2005, but there remain significant restrictions to civil-political and socio-economic 
rights while corruption, patrimonialism, divisionism, and militarism persist.21 The 
democratisation process has further been complicated by the persistence of armed 
rebellions after 1986 in western and northern Uganda, of which the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) is the most well known.  
Concerning the three democracy components of interest to this study – rule of 
law, the security forces, and participation – unequal progress has been achieved, with 
the security forces remaining the most problematic. The security forces have played a 
central role in politics in post-independence Uganda. Both Presidents Milton Obote and 
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Idi Amin mobilised the army as their support base and to enforce political control. As a 
result, the security forces became a major source of political instability and an 
oppressive social force responsible for mass human rights abuses, both within the 
security forces, as purges and summary executions were a frequent occurrence, and 
against civilians.22 Museveni worked to reduce the security forces’ predatory behaviour 
and ethnic and regional factionalism, but he has continued to rely on them to enforce his 
political power. The army, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), has been 
allowed to play a disproportionate role in politics, as illustrated by its 10 guaranteed 
seats in parliament and the 2013 appointment of an army general as internal affairs 
minister, while Museveni routinely intervenes in military appointments. Effective 
parliamentary oversight of the security forces is also limited, particularly when it comes 
to decision-making on the UPDF’s foreign interventions and the military budget. 
Military force has proven a useful means to accumulate power and gain political capital, 
while the NRM’s historical origins as an armed movement resulted in high value being 
attached to military ethos and a close intertwining of political and military leaders.  
There have been greater improvements in rule of law and participation compared 
to the security forces, but important lacunae persist. Historically, one of the central 
challenges to democracy building in Uganda has been the weight of regional and ethnic 
identities in politics. Practices of ethnic/regional favouritism were widespread under 
Obote and Amin, fuelling cycles of violence and a zero-sum competition for access to 
power and resources.23 Following its accession to power, the NRM sought to end 
sectarian exclusions based on ethno-regional belonging by creating a broad-based 
government integrating northerners and political opponents. But the NRM rapidly 
veered towards a system of one-party rule while Museveni continued to engage in 
clientelist practices based on ethnic and regional belonging. Divisions may be less overt 
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today but under the NRM political, economic, and military power has been biased in 
favour of ethnic groups from western and central Uganda.24 Participation furthermore 
suffers from restrictions placed on association rights, a trend which has deteriorated 
over recent years. While restrictions primarily target political opposition movements, 
they are also frequently imposed on civil society organisations which mobilise around 
sensitive issues such as corruption, human rights and national resource management.25  
In terms of rule of law, despite the independence of the judiciary being 
enshrined in the Ugandan constitution, political interference is common. Executive 
interference in judicial appointments at the senior level is particularly problematic, as 
the president seeks to pre-empt too much judicial independence in politically sensitive 
cases. While courts have shown a degree of independence in their rulings – most 
notably with regard to electoral disputes, trials of opposition members, and contentious 
legislation such as the 2000 Referendum (Political Systems) Act and the 2014 Anti-
Homosexuality Act – interference in the judicial process and a defiance of judicial 
rulings by the executive pose a problem.26 In addition, inadequate funding and resources 
negatively impacts judicial effectiveness as it results in a judicial underrepresentation in 
certain parts of the country, a susceptibility to corruption and backlog in court cases. 
A Cautionary Tale: Transitional Justice in a Hybrid Regime 
In the context of this incomplete transition to democracy a multifaceted approach to 
transitional justice was pursued. This section looks at three measures in particular: 
trials, commissions of inquiry, and amnesties. Upon seizing power in 1986, the NRM 
set up a Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights (CIVHR) to 
investigate human rights abuses committed by state forces since the country’s 
independence. While it produced a detailed report on state abuses, a lack of resources 
and political support meant it took eight years to complete its report and was little 
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publicised. In response to rebellion outbreaks following the NRM take-over, the 
government also pursued an amnesty policy which culminated in the adoption of an 
Amnesty Act in 2000. It offered a blanket and unconditional amnesty to all individuals 
who had engaged in anti-government insurgencies since 1986, and was accompanied by 
a demobilisation and reintegration process monitored by the Amnesty Commission. So 
far, an estimated 26,000 individuals have gone through the amnesty process. In parallel, 
the government referred the conflict in the north to the International Criminal Court in 
2003 and created a Special War Crimes Division at the Uganda High Court in 2003 
(which has since been renamed the International Crimes Division, ICD). This resulted 
in a number of indictments, but trials have been slow to proceed due to difficulties in 
gaining custody of accused and the application of the amnesty law.27  
 (De)Legitimation 
By highlighting responsibilities for past human rights abuses, transitional justice is 
expected to contribute to weakening those actors and institutions responsible for such 
abuses and thereby reduce their ability to hamper democratic transformations. In 
Uganda, the CIVHR did expose in great detail the responsibility of the security forces 
under Obote and Amin for human rights abuses. The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
in turn contributed to drawing increased attention to abuses committed by the LRA and 
thereby, according to some, forcing external actors to end their support for the group or 
neglect for the war suffering.28 However, there are limited indications that this 
contributed to containing spoiler actors or otherwise supported democratic institution-
building. 
A first observation is that it is not straightforward that such attempts at de-
legitimation contributed to constraining potential spoilers, as it had a minimal impact on 
the behaviour of actors and did not result in their removal or weakening. Actors linked 
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to the past regime went into rebellion immediately after the NRM took power while the 
ICC indictments did not prevent the LRA from abandoning the Juba peace process. 
These actors seemed impervious to their de-legitimation by transitional justice 
processes and it did not weaken their ability or willingness for rebellion and continued 
commission of human rights abuses. A possible explanation is that there was little 
follow-up to the CIVHR and that the domestic power balance had changed so 
drastically by the time its report was published that de-legitimation of the past regime 
became inconsequential. Similarly, ICC indictments were not followed by the execution 
of any of the arrest warrants. While it did result in stepped up cross-border military 
operations against the group, in the short term, this only provoked an intensification of 
human rights abuses by the LRA. The de-legitimation produced through transitional 
justice thus amounted merely to a symbolic act with no political consequences attached 
to it, and is therefore unlikely to have had much bearing on calculations made by actors 
about whether or not to act as spoilers.  
In fact, what has been more effective at reducing the influence of potential 
spoilers is the process of integration, co-optation and amnesties pursued by the 
government in response to armed rebellions. The Ugandan government has tended to 
favour a policy of pacification through integration. Over the years, it has accompanied 
offers of amnesty with opportunities for rebel actors to integrate in the military (and to 
some extent also other state institutions). These integration processes have been largely 
informal though mostly successful in promoting defections from rebel groups and 
assimilation into the new regime. 
This may point to an important difference between countries transitioning from 
armed conflict and those undergoing a political transition. Most claims about 
transitional justice’s de-legitimation effect have been drawn from post-authoritarian 
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transitions. The latter face the challenge of managing past regime collaborators and 
sympathisers who still operate within the system – whether the security forces, judiciary 
or state administration – and can therefore destabilise the system from within. Countries 
experiencing armed conflicts, in contrast, face spoilers who act from outside the state 
system. Consequently, processes of de-legitimation may not be as effective or 
appropriate in both contexts. Especially since diverse responsibilities for human rights 
abuses and political instrumentalisation are more likely to distort transitional justice’s 
de-legitimation effects in (post-) conflict environments. 
Theories about transitional justice’s effect through de-legitimation assume that 
there is a relatively clear delineation between perpetrators and victims and between 
former and past regime. In the case of Uganda, such delineations are murky as a wide 
variety of actors are responsible for human rights abuses. In such contexts who ‘needs’ 
to be de-legitimised or which authoritarian enclave should be dismantled is a complex 
and multi-dimensional problem. Most often both state and non-state actors are 
responsible for human rights violations and can act as spoilers to democratisation 
efforts. The challenge for transitional justice therefore lies in properly taking into 
account the role of these various actors and in avoiding being mobilised to serve the 
political interest of one actor, to prevent producing an undesirable ‘reverse 
legitimation’. It is precisely at this level that transitional justice mechanisms in Uganda 
have failed. 
In effect, transitional justice processes have failed to de-legitimise an important 
actor responsible for human rights abuses: the UPDF. Although the UPDF was newly 
created after 1986, and therefore does not represent an institution linked to past abusive 
regimes, the army constitutes a form of authoritarian enclave within the Ugandan state 
which weighs on democratic developments. Yet the actions of the UPDF have not 
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formed part of transitional justice debates in the country. Already at the time of 
transition, the CIVHR was specifically barred from looking into the actions of the NRM 
and crimes committed after 1986. Both the ICC and the ICD have so far also refrained 
from investigating human rights abuses committed by the army.29 The Amnesty Act, in 
turn, focuses exclusively on crimes committed by non-state actors. While this means 
there is no legal bar to the prosecution of state forces, it has, in practice further 
contributed to removing the question of army abuses from transitional justice debates. 
The Ugandan government has deliberately sought to exclude the security forces 
from the scope of transitional justice processes. It promotes the view of transitional 
justice as a ‘special’ form of justice dealing with the crimes committed by non-state 
actors. Its referral to the ICC was clearly aimed at the LRA, while the ICD was 
similarly seen as a domestic instrument exclusively meant for the prosecution of rebel 
and terrorist groups. In contrast, the government argues that crimes committed by the 
security forces fall under the purview of domestic military courts, thereby rendering 
‘exceptional’ justice measures to deal with such crimes unnecessary. In practice, 
however, there are few known cases of soldiers tried for war crimes before military 
courts, with most trials limited to smaller criminal offenses such as theft or cases of 
indiscipline and illegal detention of weapons.30 The military authorities and government 
have also been deliberately opaque by not making available a list of court martial cases 
or publishing rulings.31 
Excluding state human rights abuses from the scope of transitional justice 
processes has allowed the government to downplay abuses committed by the security 
forces. Abuses are presented as merely resulting from individual excesses rather than 
reflecting an institutional problem. State officials have in particular used the ICC’s 
decision to only focus on LRA crimes to ‘clear’ the UPDF of any wrongdoing, in a bid 
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to sustain its domestic and international standing.32 This not only had the effect of 
curtailing accountability for the security forces, but also, more broadly debates about 
the role of the military in Ugandan politics and society. By sidestepping the problem of 
army abuses transitional justice mechanisms have been unable to make a positive 
contribution to a democratic transformation of the security forces. Instead, they have 
(unwittingly) contributed to legitimising an undemocratic and abusive army and its 
continued role in Ugandan politics. 
Transitional justice has furthermore been instrumentalised to bolster the 
government’s own legitimacy. Transitional justice has proven a useful instrument for 
self-legitimation and to tip the domestic balance of power in the government’s favour. 
The CIVHR, for instance, served to scapegoat past regimes and bolster the NRM’s 
international credibility and popular legitimacy by seeming to act on its promise of 
ending misuse of power and human rights abuses.33 The ICC in turn has been mobilised 
to win international backing for the government, at a time when its military operations 
at home and abroad faced increasing criticism.34 The success of this strategy was most 
clearly illustrated by the announcement by the USA in 2011 that it would send 100 
Special Operations Forces to support UPDF operations against the LRA. Referring to 
the ICC also enabled Kampala to criminalise and thereby de-politicise the northern 
conflict. As Nouwen and Werner argue, the ICC process allowed the government to 
promote the view of the LRA as criminals and ‘enemies of humankind’ while 
rebranding itself as a champion of the international community.35 By focusing solely on 
the northern conflict, the ICC investigations furthermore enabled a framing of the 
human rights issue as merely constituting ‘an LRA problem’.  
While it is undeniable that the LRA has committed atrocious crimes, solely 
framing the problems in terms of criminality overshadows broader conflict dynamics 
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throughout the country – not just in Acholi – and wider governance problems which 
underpin the armed conflicts and human rights problems. Similarly, planned trials 
before the ICD of Allied Democratic Forces rebels,36 a rebel group from the western 
Rwenzori region currently based in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
would serve to support the government’s long-standing efforts to brand the group as 
terrorist and fundamentalist while avoiding any discussion of the political and 
socioeconomic factors underpinning long-standing discontent in that region. Thus 
criminal trials are used by the government as an instrument to defeat its (political) 
opponents and avoid addressing drivers of regime discontent. At the same time, it offers 
a means to divert international focus away from the government’s own misconduct and 
poor governance. This fits into a broader ‘image management’ strategy pursued by the 
Ugandan government to win donor support and contain international criticism of the 
regime.37 Criminal trials have thus not provided an impetus for democratic change but 
rather enabled the government to maintain the status quo and counteract donor pressures 
for democratic change. 
Reform 
A second way in which transitional justice is expected to contribute to democratic 
institution-building is the promotion of institutional and legislative reforms. By 
highlighting institutional failures that were responsible for past human rights abuses and 
demonstrating respect for human rights and democratic principles, transitional justice 
mechanisms can create an impetus for such reforms and produce changes in institutional 
behaviour. In Uganda, transitional justice has to some extent spurred on reform debates 
and catalysed the introduction of constitutional and legislative changes. However, the 
scope of these reforms and their translation into a transformation of institutional 
practices is limited. 
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Both the CIVHR and the ICC have contributed to stimulating reforms. Although 
few of its recommendations were taken on by the government, the CIVHR was able to 
weigh in on reform processes through its participation in consultations on the drafting of 
a new constitution. It submitted a proposal to the Constitutional Commission in which it 
called for the integration of a comprehensive bill of rights in the Constitution and the 
creation of a national human rights commission.38 These suggestions were integrated in 
the new constitution, resulting in the creation of the Ugandan Human Rights 
Commission (UHRC). The ICC has similarly, and maybe even to a larger extent, 
spurred on reforms. Although some of these resulted from opposition to the Court, that 
is, they were adopted in a bid to pre-empt ICC trials, they nevertheless denote important 
changes. Thus, the adoption of the ICC Act in 2010 introduced modifications in 
domestic criminal law, in particular the criminalisation of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide. More broadly, the ICC’s intervention exposed government and 
judicial actors to concepts of international criminal justice and thereby stimulated 
further legislative debates beyond the adoption of the ICC Act.39 For instance, it has 
focused greater attention on questions of due process, victim participation and 
reparations in domestic trials, while also served as a catalyst for the drafting of 
legislation on witness protection and the introduction of amendments to the penal code 
regarding gender-based violence.40 Accountability debates triggered by the ICC have 
further contributed to increasing the profile and political support for the Justice Law and 
Order Sector (JLOS), a state body created in 2001 coordinating the activities of 
government agencies working in the justice and law and order sector, thereby enhancing 
institutional capacity to promote rule of law.  
While transitional justice produced a reform effect, the scope of this appears 
restricted. Firstly, reforms only concerned rule of law, not the security forces or 
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participation. The CIVHR made recommendations in both these areas – such as the 
instauration of civil oversight over and de-ethnicisation of the security forces, the 
instauration of political rights, and redressing of past exclusionism and regional 
development imbalances - but these did not result in the adoption of concrete reform 
measures.41 Trials in turn have not dealt with the security forces, as already discussed, 
or investigated crimes that highlight problems of exclusion and marginalisation. Where 
reform measures were adopted in these areas they have been largely detached from 
transitional justice. For instance, accountability debates weighed little on government 
decision-making about reconstruction plans for the north or the 2013 National Land 
Policy. Similarly, security sector reforms and defence reviews have been divorced from 
accountability debates. The latter were essentially focused on promoting army 
integration, modernisation and army restructuring and did not integrate concerns about 
ending impunity. While the CIVHR was in operation, the government pursued a parallel 
security sector policy premised on the idea of ‘stabilisation through integration’, which 
relied on the accommodation of those responsible for human rights abuses rather than 
instilling practices of accountability. Even the more recent Uganda Defence Review 
carried out in 2002-2004 mostly refers to accountability in terms of financial 
management rather than in terms of oversight of the army’s human rights practices. 
It is worth exploring, however, whether transitional justice exerted a reform 
effect in an indirect fashion, through the creation of a more human rights-sensitive 
environment. Over time, transitional justice processes produced a normative shift by 
placing questions of accountability and human rights more centre stage in societal and 
political debates within Uganda. As a result, there is now greater scrutiny of human 
rights practices by civil society and donors, leading to heightened government 
sensitivity to this issue. This in turn, can result in greater responsiveness on its part and 
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willingness to implement reforms. Evidence that this may be occurring can be found in 
the recent creation of a Human Rights Directorate within the army, the adoption of new 
rules on cordon and search operations, and the appointment of civil-military officers 
following widespread criticisms of military operations in the Karamoja region.42 
However, this increased sensitivity to human rights criticisms also results from the 
country’s donor dependency which creates reputational concerns. As the regime is keen 
to win international legitimacy and promote itself as a capable regional military power, 
it seeks to act on human rights concerns where this can build its international image - or 
to cover them up when it threatens the regime and national army’s reputation.43 Thus, 
even where transitional justice contributes to creating a more human rights-sensitive 
environment, this may not always be sufficient to promote a genuinely reform-minded 
government. 
The scope of transitional justice’s reform effect is also restricted to the extent 
that it has mostly been limited to formal changes rather than modifications in 
institutional practice. Thus while the UHRC has contributed to placing the spotlight on 
human rights concerns and introducing a certain degree of oversight over state human 
rights practices, it has been timid in addressing abuses committed by the security forces 
during the armed conflicts. Its ability to be a genuinely independent body has shown to 
be limited, in particular when it comes to the actions of the military. Although it is too 
early to determine with certainty the effect of the more recently adopted reforms, 
preliminary findings suggest that beyond the integration of specific rights protections in 
domestic law, courts have had little impact on changing state practices on rule of law. 
There are three reasons for this.  
First, the political will to promote rule of law is mostly absent. The government 
allows human rights legislative changes where this can boost its credentials and does 
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not pose an immediate political threat. But its adherence to rule of law principles 
remains sketchy and executive interference in the judiciary persists. A recent illustration 
of this was the contentious re-appointment of Benjamin Odoki as Chief Justice in 2013, 
in violation of the Constitution. The government also does not demonstrate greater 
willingness to pursue broader policies aimed at improving judicial effectiveness, such as 
tackling corruption in the judiciary or improving citizen’s access to justice.44 
Transitional justice’s reform effect, though not negligible, has failed to produce 
substantial behavioural change as the government’s attitude towards the judiciary 
remains dominated by political considerations. 
A second factor is transitional justice’s weak contribution to bolstering judicial 
capacity in a sustainable fashion. Transitional justice processes resulted in punctual 
investments in capacity-building efforts, either by transitional justice mechanisms 
themselves (more specifically the ICC) or by third actors stimulated by the increase in 
accountability debates (NGOs and donors). But it is unclear that these have made 
substantive contributions. Training efforts have largely focused on international 
criminal and human rights law and ICD judges and registry staff, to the neglect of 
capacity-building efforts for other parts of the Ugandan judiciary. Even if one adopts 
the view that transitional justice should only focus on its domain of speciality – criminal 
justice – there have been significant challenges. Training provided to the ICD has not 
focused enough on strengthening prosecutorial, defence and administrative capacities 
while the high rotation of personnel within the ICD means that much of the training ‘got 
lost’.45 While this could, in principle, promote the spread of knowledge throughout the 
judiciary as people move to new posts, in practice, it appears, many feel that outside of 
the ICD, they have little use for the specific knowledge provided through these trainings 
and that the latter were therefore wasteful.46 Trainings provided by the ICC are even 
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more problematic as they focused on sensitising people about the Court and inciting 
greater cooperation from domestic officials, rather than investing in strengthening 
domestic judicial capacity or providing assistance to encourage domestic prosecutions.47  
Lastly, transitional justice’s reform effect is also curtailed by the shortcomings 
of transitional justice mechanisms themselves. This is particularly the case of trials, 
which have not always acted in respect of rule of law principles. The ICC, by focusing 
only on crimes committed by the LRA, has entrenched inequality before the law.48 In 
turn, the Kwoyelo trial before the ICD has highlighted a number of problems. The fact 
that only Kwoyelo was indicted and refused amnesty, while other LRA fighters 
including such senior commanders as Caesar Achellam were not, signals unfairness in 
the judicial process. It also suggests a political character to the trail processes before the 
ICD.49 The 2011 Constitutional Court ruling in the Kwoyelo case, which found that the 
ICD’s refusal to apply amnesty to Kwoyelo amounted to unequal treatment before the 
law, counteracts this in so far as it denotes respect for due process and judicial 
independence. However, the public prosecutor and JLOS’s rejection of this ruling 
indicates a lack of respect for the judicial process.50 The difficulties the ICC and ICD 
face in obtaining custody of accused or opening investigations – as a result of a lack of 
political will, weak judicial capacity, and the blanket amnesty – further entrenches 
perceptions that rule of law is not a priority. If trials are themselves not seen as agents 
of rule of law, they are unlikely to substantially contribute to improving broader 
institutional performance on this front. The above observations strongly suggest that 
even though transitional justice can impact democracy by promoting reforms, its effect 
is contingent on their embedment in broader reform processes. 
Empowerment 
A final claim about transitional justice is that it contributes to empowering individuals 
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by creating a new space and language for mobilisation, thereby increasing the scope for 
participation. One way in which it might do so is by shining the light on problems of 
marginalisation and discrimination, promoting their acknowledgment by the state, and 
giving a voice to disenfranchised groups. While marginalisation poses a central 
challenge in Uganda, evidence of transitional justice‘s empowerment effect is 
ambivalent. The main reason for this is that transitional justice mechanisms have mostly 
not addressed this issue.  
Neither truth commissions nor trial processes have really addressed problems of 
marginalisation and discrimination. The CIVHR contained one chapter dealing with 
‘discriminatory treatment’ but its scope was limited.51 But it failed to place the issue 
within a broader debate about ethno-regional divisions and marginalisation as a 
structural governance problem. Marginalisation was treated as essentially a political 
problem (in that it affects the ability of certain elites to participate in state institutions) 
rather than as a socio-political problem (in that it involves structural obstacles to 
participation of broader societal groups). While truth commissions have the ability to 
highlight problems of discrimination, inequality and social injustice – as illustrated by 
the Guatemalan and Peruvian truth commissions – this was not the case of the CIVHR 
which focused primarily on violations of physical integrity rights.  
Courts’ contribution to the empowerment of marginalised groups in Uganda has 
similarly been limited. Because no trials have taken place – apart from the aborted trial 
of LRA commander Thomas Kwoyelo before the ICD – courts have not had the 
opportunity to exert such an effect. If trials did take place, its empowerment effect 
would likely depend on the nature of the crimes prosecuted and the extent of victim 
participation in the proceedings. However, one limitation that can already be observed 
is courts’ restrictive focus on the LRA. This hampers their empowerment effect because 
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it contributes to perpetuating views of the Acholi as ‘different’ and ‘problematic’ and 
fails to challenge non-inclusive conceptions of national identity which persist in the 
country.52 Moreover, it entails the risk that other regions and communities affected by 
conflict will see criminal courts as a mechanism that does not concern itself with their 
sufferings. It would also fail to publicly highlight the abuses and marginalisation 
suffered by these other groups. In this way, courts can unwittingly contribute to 
perpetuating the disenfranchisement of certain groups. 
In contrast, although memorials have so far not taken centre stage in transitional 
justice debates in Uganda, there are suggestions that they could support empowerment. 
Local communities are increasingly turning towards such practices, which serve as 
useful spaces to voice their demands to the government. For local communities, 
memorials are first and foremost about ensuring that knowledge about what happened is 
transmitted to future generations. It is about building a heritage of the conflict and 
building a space for collective history.53 But it has been suggested that communities 
also see memorials as a way to emphasise broader aspects of the conflict, to highlight 
their grievances and demand government acknowledgment.54 This is generally with the 
aim of obtaining reparations from the government but may also serve to highlight issues 
of marginalisation and disenfranchisement, which communities do not dare to express 
through other political means out of fear for retribution.55 Victims are reportedly also 
using memorial spaces to foster social reconstruction and mobilise around social justice 
demands such as access to land and gender issues.56 While further research is needed to 
confirm these preliminary findings, it suggests an interesting way in which transitional 
justice could produce an empowerment effect.  
The Ugandan amnesty process also suggests ways in which such mechanisms 
can support empowerment of disenfranchised individuals and groups. While amnesties 
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were adopted as a means to encourage the disarmament of rebel groups, they also 
served as a means to acknowledge the particular victimisation of northern populations 
by both the government and the LRA, and the fact that many LRA fighters and 
dependents were abductees. It followed from this view that the amnesty had to be linked 
to a broader process of reintegration and social reconstruction. This was partially done 
by integrating the amnesty and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
process, and linking these to the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP), a 
government initiative aimed at addressing the marginalisation and reconstruction of the 
north launched in 1992 (under the initial name Northern Uganda Reconstruction 
Project). Placing amnesties within a broader framework of reintegration policies can 
potentially support the empowerment of disenfranchised individuals.  
In the Ugandan case, however, there have been important shortcomings which 
have limited amnesties’ impact on this front. Primarily this is because the amnesty 
process has focused solely on the reintegration of ex-combatants (and their dependants) 
and not been accompanied by support measures for local communities. This has created 
growing resentment amongst local populations who feel that the amnesty has ultimately 
served a political rather than a social purpose. Some continue to feel neglected by state 
authorities and have opposed the reintegration of ex-LRA members in their local 
communities.57 This is exacerbated by the fact that the government has systematically 
sought to bypass the issue of reparations on the grounds that the PRDP was set up to 
provide support to conflict-affected communities, though in practice it has tended to 
focus more on reconstruction and infrastructure projects rather than on redressing 
socioeconomic imbalances and promoting livelihood projects.58 Furthermore, complex 
local dynamics and the sometimes fluid line between victims and perpetrators have 
meant that blanket amnesties have been seen by local communities as insufficient to 
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support reintegration, and led them to turn to community-based practices involving 
aspects of confession and atonement to fill this void.59 Lastly, a lack of resources and 
political support has made it difficult for the Amnesty Commission to provide more 
targeted support to particularly disenfranchised individuals such as women and children. 
Thus while there are indications that transitional justice can contribute to democratic 
institution-building through empowerment, in the Ugandan case this promise was not 
fulfilled due to mechanisms’ institutional limitations and lack of focus on this potential 
role. 
Conclusion 
Whether or not transitional justice supports democratic institution-building remains a 
contentious point of debate in transitional justice scholarship, and evidence to this end is 
contradictory. This paper sought to contribute to this debate by investigating some of 
the normative assumptions about how transitional justice links to democratic institution-
building. Looking at the case of Uganda, the findings suggest that transitional justice’s 
impact on democratic institution-building through three proposed pathways – (de-) 
legitimation, reform, and participation – is more circumscribed than has so far been 
assumed. While transitional justice’s (de-)legitimation effect contributed negatively to 
democratic institution-building, it did impact the latter through the reform effect though 
only with regards to the rule of law. It also remains to be seen to what extent this will 
subsist over time and trickle-down to produce effective changes in practice. At this 
stage, evidence of transitional justice’s empowerment effect is also more suggestive 
than actual. Overall, transitional justice mechanisms in Uganda have contributed little to 
democratic institution-building through the three pathways of impact. 
There are two important implications that can be drawn from this research: one 
theoretical and one practical. At the theoretical level, the findings highlight that 
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prevailing ideas about how transitional justice impacts democratic institution-building 
(whether negatively or positively) are overall poorly conceptualised. There is a need for 
more theorising about the causal mechanisms linking both. Indeed the negative findings 
drawn here from the Ugandan case do not necessarily mean that transitional justice in 
general has no impact on democratic institution-building. Rather, it could simply signify 
that other, as yet unidentified, causal mechanisms are at play. Moreover, the fact that a 
particular pathway of impact, such as de-legitimation, can have both a positive and 
negative impact demonstrates that more attention needs to be paid to specifying the 
component parts of proposed causal mechanisms. There are clearly multiple ways in 
which processes of de-legitimation or empowerment can operate. These processes may 
moreover operate differently in function of the context in which they take place. 
Understanding the different steps and conditions under which transitional justice 
operates these effects is essential to improving our ability to assess its impact, and 
identify when transitional justice will and will not make a positive contribution.  
At a more practical level, the Ugandan experience highlights the difficulties 
transitional justice faces when implemented in a conflict environment and hybrid 
regime. It strongly suggests that expectations about transitional justice’s ability to 
support democratic-institution building in such contexts need to be lowered. This is not 
to say that transitional justice should never be pursued in such context, but that due 
consideration needs to be given to the particular challenges it poses. In conflict 
environments, the multiplicity of actors responsible for abuses, the lack of clear 
delineation between ‘old’ and ‘new’ regime, and state actors’ prioritisation of other 
policy goals such as stabilisation means that transitional justice mechanisms are at risk 
of (unwittingly) legitimising and reinforcing one or the other party to the conflict. In the 
context of hybrid regimes, where a logic of regime survival and habit of using 
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‘democratic trappings’ as a means of regime legitimation tend to dominate, transitional 
justice is at acute risk of political instrumentalisation. While transitional justice may 
nevertheless contribute to creating little pockets of change in such countries – as 
exemplified in Uganda by the legislative reforms on human rights triggered by ICC 
debates and local communities’ mobilisation of memorials as spaces to express socio-
political demands – it remains an open question whether this is sufficient to produce 
sustainable democratic change. The Ugandan case thus seems to support claims that 
transitional justice is dependent on the achievement of a minimum of democratic 
progress. But even more importantly, it suggests that viewing the relationship between 
transitional justice and democratic institution-building as interdependent (depending on 
time and context, one or the other may reinforce the other) rather than unidirectional 
(transitional justice causes or hampers democracy) may be a more fruitful way for 
advancing our understanding of transitional justice’s impact. 
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2. The year 1986 is taken as the transition moment because the NRM’s arrival into power 
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25. Human Rights Watch, Curtailing Criticism. 
26. Tripp, Museveni’s Uganda, 86-91; International Bar Association, Judicial Independence. 
27. One of the ICC indictees, Raska Luwiya, has since been confirmed dead while two others, 
Vincent Otti and Okot Odhiambo, are suspected to have died in 2007 and 2013 respectively. 
LRA commander Domnic Ongwen was transferred to the ICC following his capture/surrender 
in the Central African Republic in January 2015. The case before the ICD against Thomas 
Kwoyelo stalled after a 2011 ruling that the amnesty was applicable, but is expected to resume 
after the Supreme Court reversed this decision in April 2015. ADF leader Jamil Mukulu is 
expected to be tried before the ICD following his capture in Tanzania in April 2015. 
28. Akhavan, “The LRA Case”, 416; for a divergent view see Refugee Law Project, Ambiguous 
Impacts, 15-18. 
29. For a critical discussion of the ICC’s prosecutorial choices see Clark, “Chasing Cases”. 
30. Interview with Ugandan civil society actor, Kampala, February 2014; Human Rights Watch, 
Uprooted and Forgotten, 41-45. 
31. Interview with foreign official, Kampala, February 2014. 
32. Nouwen, The ICC’s Intervention, 24. 
33. Quinn, “Constraints”, 417. 
34. Branch, “Uganda’s Civil War”, 184; Freeland, “Rethinking the State”, 309. 
35. Nouwen and Werner, “Doing Justice”, 947-950. 
36. Interview with judicial official, Kampala, February 2014. 
37. Fisher, “When it pays to be a Fragile State”. 
38. Quinn, “Constraints”, 419 
39. Wierda, “Comparison of the Legacy”. 
40. Nouwen, The ICC’s Intervention, 10-11; Interviews with Ugandan and international civil 
society actors, Kampala, February 2014. 
41. CIVHR report, 587-605. 
42. Interview with foreign official, Kampala, February 2014; Human Rights Watch, “Get the 
Gun!”, 67. 
43. Kampala’s sensitivity to allegations of army human rights abuses when these might affect 
the international standing of the regime and UPDF is illustrated by its vociferous reaction to the 
publication of the UN Mapping Exercise Report in 2010, which detailed human rights abuses 
committed by the UPDF in neighbouring DRC, and its subsequent threat to close the OHCHR 
office in the country in retaliation.   
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/DRC_Report_Comments_Uganda.pdf  
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45. International Crimes Division Annual Report 2012; Interview with Ugandan lawyer, 
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